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1 INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory, with substantive
application in all major elds in economics, particularly industrial organization. It is
the benchmark theoretical model for analyzing strategic interactions among a handful of
players. Given the importance of gaming in economic theory, the empirical analysis of
games has been the focus of a recent literature in econometrics and industrial organization,
such as Tamer (2003), Berry & Tamer (2007), Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007), Aradillas-
Lopez (2007, 2008), Ciliberto & Tamer (2009), Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov (2010)
and Bajari, Hong & Ryan (2010) (hereafter BHR).
Econometrically, a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice
model, such as the conditional logit or multinomial probit. An agent's utility is often
assumed to be a linear function of covariates and a random preference shock. However,
unlike a discrete choice model, utility is also allowed to depend on the actions of other
agents. Such modeling strategy was rst suggested by the seminal work of Bresnahan
& Reiss (1990, 1991). Although there are numerous studies on both methodology and
empirical applications of game-theoretic models, the most widely studies is the class of
incomplete information simultaneous-move games (normal form) and dynamic games, see
Tamer (2003), Bajari, Hong, Krainer & Nekipelov (2010) and Aguirregabiria & Mira
(2007). The complete information games received fewer studies due to its computa-
tional complexity, since it involves multidimensional integrals. More recently, Ciliberto
& Tamer (2009) and BHR (2010) provide simulation-based estimators for static complete
information discrete games. Furthermore, estimation of sequential-move (extensive form)
games has been quite limited, especially on its' general form, Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002)
and Schmidt-Dengler (2006) estimate some simplied sequential-move games with special
game structure. The estimation of the general class of sequential move games has suered
from its computational complications, Maruyama (2009) provides a simulation-based es-
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timator for the general class of discrete-choice perfect information sequential move games
with a modied version of the GHK simulator (Geweke (1989, 1991), Hajivassiliou &
McFadden (1998) and Keane (1990, 1994)), which he called as "sequential GHK". The
estimator provided by Maruyama (2009) essentially is a maximum simulated likelihood
(MSL) estimator, As is well known, MSL is biased for any xed number of simulations,
in order to obtain
p
T consistent estimators, one needs to increase the number of draws
NS so that NSp
T
!1. Wang & Graham (2009) provides a generalized maximum entropy
(GME) estimator for this class of games which avoids the usual multidimensional inte-
grals by using the data constraints instead of the moment constraints, they reformulate
the estimation problem as a mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problem since there
are logical connections between endogenous variables among the equilibrium conditions,
although the computational burden is acceptable for most applications, it is hard to con-
struct large sample properties for this GME estimator, since essentially it is a nonsmooth
estimation1.
In this paper, we propose a simulation based estimator for discrete sequential move
games of perfect information which relies on the simulated moments and importance
sampling. As noted by Maruyama (2009), the estimation of sequential games has some
distinctive features and advantages over simultaneous games, the most advantage is that
perfect information sequential games can utilize the notion of subgame perfection, which
guarantees the existence of unique equilibria, however, in simultaneous games of complete
information, the existence of multiple equilibria is sometimes considered problematic or
at least an issue to deal with (see for example, Ciliberto & Tamer, 2007; BHR, 2010).
The moment conditions implied by the model equilibrium conditions in discrete se-
quential move games of perfect information contain multidimensional integrals, in princi-
ple, one can use straightforward monte Carlo simulations to get unbiased estimators for
1One can use the bootstrap or other resampling methods to do the inference with this GME estima-
tion, but little is known about the ability of such methods to provide asymptotic renements or even the
consistent approximation to the asymptotic distribution.
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such multidimensional integrals, but there are several problems that can arise with estima-
tors based on such simulations. First, there are discrete parts of the model, the objective
function in the estimation procedure is typically discontinuous in the parameter vector,
making it hard to minimize (maximize) correctly; Second, the straightforward monte
carlo simulations need to solve the game numerous times, typically once for every draw,
for every observation, for every parameter vector that is ever evaluated in an optimization
procedure. If we have T observations, performs NS simulation draws, and optimization
requires R function evaluations, estimation requires solving the model NS  T R times,
this can be computationally time consuming since R can be quite large. In spirit of Acker-
berg (2009) and BHR (2010), we make use of importance sampling to overcome both of
the problems, by nding the right change of variables to do the importance sampling over,
the simulated approximation of the multidimensional integral (expectation) will generally
be continuous in the parameter vector, and also one reduce the times of solving the game
from NS T R to NS T .2 In order to make use of importance sampling, it is important
to make sure that the tails of the importance density are not too thin in a neighborhood
of the parameter that minimizes (maximizes) the objective function in the estimation
procedure, the GME estimator proposed by Wang & Graham (2009) can be used to con-
struct the importance density, or one can make use of the MSL estimator proposed by
Maruyama (2009). Based on such simulated moments, we propose two estimators for the
discrete sequential move games of perfect information, one is the method of simulated
moments (MSM), which is same as the usual GMM estimation but use the simulated mo-
ments instead of the true moments. Given that the equilibrium conditions are conditional
moment restrictions, same as the GMM estimation, MSM estimation may induce incon-
sistent estimates due to the number of arbitrarily chosen instruments is nite, we make
use of the always consistent estimation procedure that is directly based on the denition
2One can even reduce this computation times to NS by using the same simulation draws for dierent
observations, see Ackerberg (2009).
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of the conditional moments proposed by Dominguez & Lobato (2004). Our monte Carlo
experiments show that the always consistent estimator performs better than the MSM
estimator, especially in the small sample size.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete
sequential-move games to be estimated and formulate its equilibrium conditions, the as-
sumptions for the identication and estimation also are presented. Section 3 formalizes
our simulation and estimation approach. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 concludes, and provides limitations and future work.
2 THE MODEL
In the model, there are T independent repetitions of a sequential move game of perfect
information (extensive form game). In each game there are i = 1; :::; Nt players, each
with the nite set of actions Ait. Dene At = iAit and let at = (a1t; :::; ait; :::aNt) denote
a generic element of At. Without loss of generality, the order of subscripts for players
(1; :::; Nt) also represents the decision order of the sequential move game in each repetition,
that means player 1 makes decision rst and playerNt at the end. Player i's von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) utility is a map uit : At ! R, where R is the real line. Since we
study the sequential move game, the corresponding equilibrium concept is the subgame
perfect equilibria (SPE), this can be achieved when every player expects no gain from
individually deviating from its equilibrium strategy in its every subgame, the standard
technique for solving the SPE is backward induction, furthermore, the nite sequential
move game of perfect information where there is no player is indierence between any two
outcomes has a unique SPE. We will sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when
no ambiguity would arise.
Following Bresnahan & Reiss (1990, 1991), assume that the vNM utility of player i
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can be written as:
ui(a; x; i; ) = i(x; a; ) + i(a) (1)
In Equation (1), player i's vNM utility from action a is the sum of two terms. The rst
term i(x; a; ) is a function which depends on a, the vector of actions taken by all of the
players, covariates x, the players' characteristics and some other variables which inuence
the utility, and parameters , covariates x are observed to the econometrician. The second
term is i(a), a random preference shock which reects the information about utility that
is common knowledge to the players but not observed by the econometrician. Unlike
Maruyama (2009), here the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of actions a, not
just the actions taken by player i. As argued by BHR (2010), this is a more general setting
and seems straightforward within the game framework, think about a simple entry game,
the unobserved information of one player to econometrician may be dierent not only
among players but also action vector dependent3. i(a) are assumed to be independent,
let i denote the vector of the individual i(a) and i denote the vector of all the shocks.
we will discuss more about the structure of i in the model assumptions.
As noted above, the equilibrium concept corresponding to the sequential move game of
perfect information, SPE, is a equilibrium strategy prole which means that every player
expects no gain from individually deviating from its equilibrium in every subgame. A
strategy of player i 2 N is a function that assigns an action in Ai to each nonterminal
history, a player's deviation form equilibrium holding other's decisions xed does not mean
that all the others make the same decision, it means the others follow the same strategy.
But what can be observed is only the equilibrium actions (i.e., equilibrium outcome).
Thus, for deriving the equilibrium conditions in our econometric model, we should make
the others' action prole when one player deviating as endogenous variable. Formally, an
3One can nd that this specication of the preference shock also facilitates the use of importance
sampling, since the usual use of importance sampling in the discrete choice models requires the random
coecients specication.
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SPE action prole, aSPE = (aSPE1 ; :::a
SPE
i ; :::a
SPE
N ), is any solution for the decisions of the
players that satises:
ui(a
SPE
i ; a
SPE
 i ; x; i; )  ui(ai; aSPE<i ; a>i(aSPE<i ; ai); x; i; )  0 (2)
for all i = 1; :::; N and all ai 6= aSPEi .
where a>i(a
SPE
<i ; ai) is a SPE action prole for the subgame that starts from player i+ 1
given the decisions of the preceding players, ai. This equilibrium conditions are dened
recursively and the solution can be easily calculated by the backward induction for any
given parameters , observed covariates, x, and unobservable shocks . Kuhn's theorem
ensures the existence of solutions of the inequality system (2) but makes no claim of
uniqueness, thus we can conclude that every nite sequential move game of perfect infor-
mation has a SPE. As noted by Berry & Tamer(2007), dealing with multiple equilibria
complicate the identication problem, fortunately, a modied version of Kuhn's theorem
ensures the uniqueness of equilibria of nite sequential move games of perfect information,
which is presented in theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Every nite sequential move game with perfect information in which no
player is indierence between any two outcomes has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Osborne & Rubinstein (1994).
Obviously, the indierence case can be ignored in our econometric model since we
work with continuous latent payos (i(a) has an atomless distribution). Given such
structure of the discrete choice sequential move game, our task is to estimate and draw
an inference about the parameters of payo functions, , with the observation of action
prole ao, some covariates which have eect on the payos, x, and an exogenous decision
order. Note that the actual payo levels are unobserved, since in most case, we can not
determine what they should be, i.e. they are the latent variables. Before presenting our
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estimation strategy, some assumptions about the model structure are introduced.
2.1 Assumptions
Assumption 1 (Exogenous Decision Order) The decision order of agents in the se-
quential move game is exogenous.
Although the exact decision order of agents is rarely observed, we can estimate se-
quential move games by imposing dierent decision order assumptions, this restriction
only excludes the endogenous decision order which may alter the uniqueness of the game
structure.
Assumption 2 (Scale and Location Normalizations) The payo of one action for
each player are xed at a known constant.
As argued by BHR (2010), this restriction is similar to the argument that we can
normalize the mean utility from the outside good equal to a constant, usually zero, in a
standard discrete choice model. One clearly nd that from the equilibrium condition (2)
that adding a constant to all deterministic payos does not perturb the set of equilib-
ria, so a location normalization is necessary. A scale normalization is also necessary, as
multiplying all deterministic payos by a positive constant does not alter the SPE. This
restriction is subsumed in the following assumption about the distribution of the error
terms.
Assumption 3 (Regularity Conditions of Random Shocks) The joint distribution
of  = (i(a)), G(j) is independent and known to all agents and the econometri-
cian.
This restriction allows G to be any known joint parametric distribution, identication
in this game with unknown G is complicated, and since our estimation is based on the
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simulation which relies on the distribution of error terms, the case with unknown G will
not be dealt with here.
3 ESTIMATION
Next, we propose computationally ecient simulation based estimators for  and , the
parameters governing agents' deterministic payos and the error terms' distribution, given
the observations of a sequence (at; xt) of action proles and covariates. To form the
estimation framework, enumerate the elements of A from k = f1; :::;#Ag. Denote the
observation at tth repetition of the game with yt and
yt =
266666666664
I(at = 1)
:
I(at = k)
:
I(at = #A)
377777777775
= f(xt; t; 0) (3)
where I() is the usual indicator function, f(xt; t; ) is an algorithm which solves the
game for any given xt, t and , obviously, it is corresponding to the model equilibrium
conditions (2). Denote the probability that a specic action prole k is played implied by
the model as P (kjxt; ) and collect them into a vector P (ajxt; ), where
P (ajxt; ; ) = E[f(xt; t; )jxt] =
Z
f(xt; t; )dG(; ) (4)
At the true parameters of the data-generating process the predicted probability of each
action equals its empirical probability of each action k:
E[(yt   P (ajxt; ; ))jxt] = 0 at  = 0;  = 0 (5)
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Note that, because the probability of all of the elements of must sum to one, one of
these probabilities will be linearly dependent on the others, so there are eectively #A 
1 conditional moment restrictions. Obviously, the expectation of any function w(xt)
of the conditioning variables multiplied by the dierence between yt and the predicted
probabilities is identically zero at the true parameters, i.e.
E[w(xt)  (yt   P (ajxt; ; ))] = 0 at  = 0;  = 0 (6)
In principle, the value of  and , say ^ and ^, that set the sample analog of this moment
GT (; ) =
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   P (ajxt; ; ))]
equal to zero or as close as possible to zero is a consistent estimator of 0 and 0. Un-
der appropriate regularity conditions, one obtains asymptotic normality of the estimators
(Hansen, 1982), and as the number of moments used increases, one can approach asymp-
totic eciency by the right choice of instruments (i.e. the w function).
To make use of such GMM estimation, we should overcome some obstacles, the rst
obstacle is that the predicted probabilities P (ajxt; ; ) which dened by (4) is not easily
computable, since it involves a multidimensional integral, thus simulation enters the pic-
ture. As can be found below, a straightforward Monte Carlo procedure is not practical due
to the computational burden and discreteness in f(xt; t; ), we make use of importance
sampling to overcome such problems.
3.1 Simulation
The straightforward way of simulating
P (ajxt; ; ) = E[f(xt; t; )jxt] =
Z
f(xt; t; )dG(; )
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is by averaging f(xt; t; ) over a set ofNS random draws (1; :::; NS) from the distribution
of t, G(j), i.e.
~P (ajxt; ; ) = 1
NS
X
ns
f(xt; t; ) (7)
~P (ajxt; ; ) is trivially an unbiased simulator of the true expectation P (ajxt; ; ) =
E[f(xt; t; )jxt]. McFadden (1989) and Pakes & Pollard (1989) prove statistical properties
of the MSM estimator that set the simulated moment:
~GT (; ) =
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   ~P (ajxt; ; ))]
=
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   1
NS
X
ns
f(xt; t; ))] (8)
as close as possible to zero. The most important of these statistical properties is the
fact that these estimators are typically consistent for nite NS. The intuition behind
this is that simulation error averages out over observations as T !1. This consistency
property gives the estimator an advantage over alternative estimation approaches such as
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL), which typically is not consistent for a nite number
of simulation draws. Another nice property of these estimators is that the extra variance
imparted on the estimates due to the simulation is relatively small, asymptotically it is
1=NS. As noted above, an important obstacle of making use of MSM estimation procedure
in our sequential game estimation is that f(xt; t; ) typically is not continuous in ,
since the algorithm for solving the discrete sequential move game of perfect information
essentially is a combination of several indicator functions, which is not continuous in .
The discreteness in f(xt; t; ) will generate the discreteness in ~P (ajxt; ; ), as can be
found via a simple entry game conducted in example 1. Thus the simulated moments,
~GT (; ), will tend not to be continuous in , typically having both ats and jumps.
This can be very problematic in the numeric minimization of ~GT (; ), derivative based
methods are useless.
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Example 1 To illustrate the discreteness problem, consider a simple two-rm sequential
entry game, where rm 1 moves rst. Each rm has the following prot function:
ui(x; a; i; ) = 1(ai = 1)fxi1 +N(a)2 + i(a)g
where ai 2 f0; 1g is rm i's action, N(a) is the number of entrants for a action prole a.
Function f maps (x; ; ) into the market structure (outcome) y,
y =
266666664
I(0; 0)
I(0; 1)
I(1; 0)
I(1; 1)
377777775
= f(x; ; )
For exposition we focus on the 2nd element of y, we can write this out explicitly as:
y2 = I(0; 1) = I
0BBBBBBBBBB@
[0 > x11 + 2 + 1(1; 0) \ 0 > x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
[
[0 > x11 + 22 + 1(1; 1) \ 0  x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
\
x21 + 2 + 2(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
Obviously, function f is not continuos in . The straightforward simulator
~P ((0; 1)jxt; ; ) = 1
NS
X
ns
I
0BBBBBBBBBB@
[0 > x11 + 2 + 1;ns(1; 0) \ 0 > x21 + 22 + 2;ns(1; 1)]
[
[0 > x11 + 22 + 1;ns(1; 1) \ 0  x21 + 22 + 2;ns(1; 1)]
\
x21 + 2 + 2;ns(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
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is also not continuos in .
In spirit of Ackerberg (2009) and BHR (2010), we make use of importance sampling to
reduce the non-smoothness problem4. Importance sampling is most noted for its ability to
reduce simulation error and computational burden, and was rst used in game-theoretic
models estimation by BHR (2010), who estimated norm form complete information games.
First, we change the variable of integration in Equation (4) from  to u. Let h(ujx; ; )
denote the density of u, conditional on x,  and , and g(i(a)j) the density of i(a).
Then the density h(ujx; ; ) is:
h(ujx; ; ) =
Y
i
Y
a2A
g(ui(a; x; i; )  i(x; a; )j) (9)
If we change the variable of integration in
P (ajxt; ; ) = E[f(xt; t; )jxt] =
Z
f(xt; t; )dG(; )
=
Z
f(xt; t; )g(j)d
from  to u, then P (ajxt; ; ) becomes:
P (ajxt; ; ) =
Z
f(u)h(ujxt; ; )du (10)
In order to use importance sampling, introduce the importance density q(u), rewrite
Equation (10) as:
P (ajxt; ; ) =
Z
f(u)
h(ujxt; ; )
q(u)
q(u)du (11)
4McFadden (1989) noted the ability to use importance sampling to smooth simulations which is
extended by Ackerberg (2009).
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We can then simulate P (ajxt; ; ) by draw random variables u1; :::uNS from q(u) and
construct
P^ (ajxt; ; ) = 1
NS
NSX
ns=1
f(uns)
h(unsjxt; ; )
q(uns)
(12)
Note that
E[P^ (ajxt; ; )] = E[f(u)h(ujxt; ; )
q(u)
]
=
Z
f(u)
h(ujxt; ; )
q(u)
q(u)du
= E[f(xt; t; )jxt]
 P (ajxt; ; )
So the importance sampling simulator P^ (ajxt; ; ) is an unbiased simulator for the true
expectation. The most important property of this simulator is that P^ (ajxt; ; ) will
generally be continuous in  and  since it only depends on  and  through h(ujxt; ; )
which is continuous in  and  given that g(j) is continuous, this can be revealed by
using this simulator in the simple two-player entry game which conducted in Example 1.
Example 2 (Ex.1 Cont') Consider the two-player entry game conducted in Example 1.
For exposition we also only focus on the 2nd element of y:
y2 = I(0; 1) = I
0BBBBBBBBBB@
[0 > x11 + 2 + 1(1; 0) \ 0 > x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
[
[0 > x11 + 22 + 1(1; 1) \ 0  x21 + 22 + 2(1; 1)]
\
x21 + 2 + 2(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
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A change of variables from  to u resulting in
P^ ((0; 1)jxt; ; ) = 1
NS
X
ns
I
0BBBBBBBBBB@
[0 > u1;ns(1; 0) \ 0 > u2;ns(1; 1)]
[
[0 > u1;ns(1; 1) \ 0  u2;ns(1; 1)]
\
u2;ns(0; 1)  0
1CCCCCCCCCCA
h(unsjxt; ; )
q(uns)
obviously, given that g(j) is continuous, this simulator is smooth in the underlying
parameters.
Although the theory of importance sampling proves that P^ (ajxt; ; ) is a smooth and
unbiased simulator for any choice of the importance density q(u) which has suciently
large support. However, as noted by BHR(2010), as a practical matter, it is important to
make sure that the tails of the importance density q(u) are not too thin in a neighborhood
of the parameter that minimizes the objective function in our estimator. One natural
choice of q(u) is h(ujx;;) where  and  are some guess or preliminary estimate of 
and . To ensure that the importance density q(u) are not too thin in a neighborhood
of the estimated parameters, we found that the generalized maximum entropy (GME)
estimator proposed by Wang & Graham (2009) is a good choice for  and , also we can
set the importance density equals to the distribution of utilities conditional on x in the
GME estimation, this means that for each value of x we simulate the GME estimation NS
times. At the same time, since P^ (ajxt; ; ) only depends on  and  through h(ujxt; ; )
which is continuous in  and  given that g(j) is continuous, in computations, the f(uns)
and q(uns) should be stored as they do not vary as the underlying parameters changes
in the estimation procedure, then as the underlying parameters changes, one only need
re-compute the density h(ujx; ; ).
15
3.2 The Estimator
Given the importance simulator P^ (ajxt; ; ), we can replace the moment conditions in
Equation (6) by its simulation analog:
G^T (; ) =
1
T
X
t
[w(xt)  (yt   P^ (ajxt; ; ))]
Then for a positive denite weighting matrix WT , the MSM estimator is:
(^MSM ; ^MSM) = arg minf;g
G^T (; )
0
WT G^T (; ) (13)
The asymptotic theory for estimating discrete choice models using MSM is well developed
by McFadden (1989) and Pakes & Pollard (1989). Christian Gourieoux & Alain Mon-
fort (2002) has done a formal analysis of the MSM estimation in the GMM framework,
involved the optimal choice of the weighting matrix WT and instrumental matrix w(xt).
However, this MSM estimator which relies on the conditional moment restrictions (5),
just as the GMM, can render inconsistent estimates since the number of arbitrarily cho-
sen instruments is nite. In fact, consistency of the GMM estimators relies on additional
assumptions that imply unclear restrictions on the data generating process. To avoid
such inconsistent case, we can make use of the consistent estimation of models dened by
conditional moment restrictions proposed by Dominguez & Lobato (2004)5, but use the
simulation analog instead of the usual sample analog. The always consistent estimator
can be dened as:
(^AC ; ^AC) = arg minf;g
1
T 3
TX
l=1
24 TX
t=1
m^(yt; xt)I(xt  xl)
!0  
TX
t=1
m^(yt; xt)I(xt  xl)
!35
(14)
5The main idea behind this estimation is that use the whole information about the parameters
contained in the conditional moments E[h(Yt; 0)jXt] = 0 by the fact: E[h(Yt; 0)jXt] = 0 ()
E[h(Yt; 0)I(Xt  x)].
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where
m^(yt; xt) = yt   P^ (ajxt; ; ) (15)
This estimator is always consistent but inecient since it does not control the minimiza-
tion of the covariance, Dominguez & Lobato (2004) briey discussed that by carrying
out a single Newton-Raphson step in the direction of the ecient GMM estimator, an
asymptotically ecient estimator can be constructed. Another choice of the ecient
estimation is Kitamura, Tripathi & Ahn (2004)'s local estimation, but it needs to intro-
duce a bandwidth number, although this bandwidth number allows the estimator to be
root  n asymptotically normal and ecient, statistical inference with this estimator can
be sensitive to the selection of the bandwidth number.
4 MONTE CARLO
To demonstrate the performance of our estimator in nite samples, we conducted a simple
Monte Carlo experiment using the simple sequential entry game introduced in Example
1. There are two players and each player has the following prot function:
ui(x; a; i; ) = 1(ai = 1)f1xi1 + 2xi2 + 3xi3 + i(a)g (16)
where player 1 moves rst. We assume that
x11  N(20; 1)
x12  N(11; 3)
x21  N(26; 1)
x22  N(11; 3)
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xi3 = N(a)
where N(a) is the number of entrants for a action prole a, and it(a), the idiosyncratic
error term, are drawn from standard normal distribution. As discussed previously, our
model requires both scale and location normalizations, so we assume the variance of the
error terms is one and the payos of not entering are zero. Thus our game has three un-
known parameters: 1; 2 and 3. We generated 1000 samples of size T = 25; 50; 100; 200
and 400 to assess the nite sample properties of our estimator, rst use importance sim-
ulator (12) get P^ (ajxt; ; ) for each t then generate the simulated analog (15). The true
parameter vector was chosen as
1 = 1; 2 =  1; 3 =  8
the random draws in the importance sampling, NS, is 1000.
In Table I we report the mean, median, standard deviation, mean bias, median bias
and mean square error (MSE) for the MSM estimator dened in (13) for ve sample sizes,
T = 25; 50; 100; 200 and 400 and Table II for the AC estimator dened in (14), which show
that both estimators can perform well in moderately-sized samples, the payo parameters
are estimated near their true values, and as the sample size increase, the estimates become
more precisely. The comparison between the MSM estimator and AC estimator shows the
superiority of AC estimator, especially in small samples. One may nd that parameters
are estimated much less precision when sample size is 400, this may due to the large scale
non-linear algorithm we've chosen. Actually, since the objective function of our estimate
is not globally convex, we choose the global optimization algorithm "LGO"6 in GAMS,
a more meticulous modication on the algorithm details should increase the performance
of our estimation in large samples.
6The Lipschitz-Continuous Global Optimizer (LGO) developed by Janos D. Pinter.
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Table I: Monte Carlo Results for MSM
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
1 1:0769 1:0774 0:1332 0:0769 0:0774 0:0236
2  1:1254  1:1039 0:2196  0:1254  0:1039 0:0639
3  8:4267  8:4045 1:0817  0:4267  0:4045 1:2637
T = 50
1 1:0721 1:0730 0:1311 0:0721 0:0730 0:0224
2  1:1140  1:0953 0:2203  0:1140  0:0953 0:0615
3  8:3077  8:2143 1:0196  0:3077  0:2143 1:2206
T = 100
1 1:0239 1:0242 0:1111 0:0239 0:0242 0:0129
2  1:0201  1:0133 0:1371  0:0201  0:0133 0:0192
3  8:1938  8:1152 0:9040  0:1938  0:1152 0:8539
T = 200
1 1:0089 1:0065 0:1070 0:0089 0:0065 0:0115
2  0:9960  0:9937 0:1239 0:0040 0:006 3 0:0154
3  8:0946  8:0422 0:8521 0:0946 0:0422 0:7343
T = 400
1 1:0071 1:0022 0:0886 0:0071 0:0022 0:0079
2  0:9979  0:9944 0:1011 0:0021 0:0056 0:0102
3  8:0918  8:0367 0:7070  0:0918  0:0367 0:5078
True value: 1 = 1, 2 =  1; 3 =  8; Monte Carlo Times: 1000
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Table II: Monte Carlo Results for AC
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
1 1:0409 1:0325 0:1296 0:0409 0:0325 0:0184
2  1:0618  1:0385 0:2671  0:0618  0:0385 0:0751
3  8:1269  8:7044 0:8386  0:1269  0:7044 0:7186
T = 50
1 1:0328 1:0270 0:1299 0:0328 0:0270 0:0179
2  1:0496  1:0220 0:2027  0:0496  0:0220 0:0435
3  8:1054  8:1655 0:8017  0:1054  0:1655 0:6532
T = 100
1 1:0109 1:0157 0:0663 0:0109 0:0157 0:0045
2  1:0050  1:0027 0:0907  0:0050  0:0027 0:0082
3  8:1199  8:1546 0:6529  0:1199  0:1546 0:4402
T = 200
1 1:0038 1:0137 0:0666 0:0038 0:0137 0:0044
2  1:0010  1:0027 0:0805  0:0010  0:0027 0:0065
3  8:0401  8:0788 0:6129  0:0401  0:0788 0:3770
T = 400
1 1:0103 1:0164 0:0655 0:0103 0:0164 0:0043
2  1:0096  1:0089 0:0750  0:0096  0:0089 0:0057
3  8:0817  8:1049 0:5677  0:0817  0:1049 0:3287
True value: 1 = 1, 2 =  1; 3 =  8; Monte Carlo Times: 1000
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed the simulation based estimation for the discrete sequential
move game of perfect information, which relies on the simulated moments and importance
sampling. We use importance sampling techniques not only to reduce computational
burden and simulation error, but also to overcome non-smoothness problems. Monte Carlo
evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples.
The most limitation of our estimation is that it relies on the known distribution of random
preference shocks which is rarely known to researchers, working with the unknown G(j)
is an important topic for future research. Another interesting issue concerns the ecient
estimation of the simulated conditional moments, although in a full parametric model, we
can make use of the rst order condition of the likelihood function, the simulated score
may not exist since the simulated choice probability can be zero in some random draws.
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